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ARC Working Paper No. 1 
 
What is a laboratory in the human sciences? 
 
Stephen J. Collier, Andrew Lakoff and Paul Rabinow 
 
“A new ‘science’ emerges where new problems are pursued by 
new methods and truths are thereby discovered which open up 
significant new points of view.”1 
 
 
Over the past year we have been developing a long-term collaborative program 
for work in the anthropology of the contemporary. Broadly speaking, our 
motivation for doing so arose out of dissatisfaction with what is at least one 
dominant model of knowledge production in the interpretive human sciences. 
This model – that of the “individual project” – rests on a myth of sui generis 
intellectual production. The individual project model assumes that interpretive 
and authorial virtuosity is the mainspring of good work. At its best, it produces 
genuinely innovative and original scholarship. At its worst, it results in 
workshops, conference papers, collected volumes and monographs in which 
the emphasis is placed on individual performance, and in which there is not 
much discussion or debate about what the key problems for the field are, and 
how to best approach them – nor is there evidence of shared norms that lead to 
better understanding of significant phenomena. 
 
In contrast, we wanted to explore a model of academic production that would 
include individual work but that would also recognize the centrality of – and 
create organizational space for – serious collaborative work. By collaboration 
we have in mind two different kinds of work: first, the joint production of papers 
and research; and second, concept development, collective reflection, and 
shared standards of evaluation. 
 
We decided to call this collective endeavor a “laboratory.” On many important 
points this endeavor diverges from a laboratory in the natural sciences – as we 
will describe below. And yet, the rubric of a laboratory has provided a context in 
which to make explicit, and to critically examine, various aspects of how our 
collaboration is organized.  
 
At this point, the laboratory remains very much in a process of formation. But 
over the course of the past year it has begun to function in a practical sense in 
a number of ways. The laboratory is centered around three principal 
investigators – Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow – who have met regularly over this 
period. It has an institutional home at the Molecular Sciences Institute in 
Berkeley, California, but much activity has taken place in New York and San 
                                                
1 Max Weber, Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffé, “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy,” in 
Weber, Methodology, p. 68, cit. in Rabinow, Anthropos Today, p. 36. 
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Diego. Close collaborative relationships with a broader range of students and 
colleagues have developed in Berkeley (between Rabinow and a number of 
graduate students working on security) and in New York (where Collier and 
Lakoff have collaborated with each other and with Lyle Fearnley). Finally, a 
number of preliminary projects – empirical “soundings” – have begun, on topics 
including syndromic surveillance, vaccination, synthetic biology, and risk 
management techniques.  
 
It is also important to mention that this project is going on in close conversation 
with several other important attempts to explore new inter-connections among 
researchers in the human sciences, among them the UC Irvine Center for 
Ethnography Initiative, the Rice project on the anthropology of expertise, and 
the BIOS Center at the London School of Economics. 
 
This discussion paper, then, is a kind of stock-taking of a project that is 
beginning to take shape, but is still in its early stages of development. First, it 
outlines our motivation for working on new forms of collective and collaborative 
work in the interpretive human sciences by describing our respective pathways 
to this project. Second, it describes how we arrived at the laboratory concept 
and some of the reflections it has provoked relative to dominant models of 
knowledge production in our part of the academy.  
 
 
Background 
 
Our motivation for forming a laboratory arose from both long-term interests in 
problems of knowledge-production in the interpretive human sciences and from 
short-term challenges to which we felt that a laboratory-type organization 
would be most able to respond. 
 
For Rabinow, questions around how knowledge is produced in the human 
sciences have been long-term interests.2 For Collier and Lakoff, reflection on 
knowledge production in anthropology began after returning from fieldwork. As 
is perhaps typical at this stage, questions arose for them such as: how to 
integrate detailed [their] research material with broader questions in the 
discipline? What broader claims could be made based on their particular 
research? These questions led to a series of conversations with Rabinow in 
Berkeley concerning problems of “method” in anthropology. Whereas most 
discussion of “method” in the discipline revolved around a specific technique of 
                                                
2 See, for example, Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977; Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds., Interpretive Social Science: A 
Reader. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979; Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Paul 
Rabinow, Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003. 
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data-gathering – namely, ethnography – it seemed important to begin a 
discussion about the norms of knowledge production in the field, and about 
shared problems and concepts that might be collectively worked on and 
developed. These conversations took the form of attempts to specify the 
meanings and uses of certain conceptual tools for describing research objects 
– for example, terms like “apparatus,” “assemblage,” and “normativity.” In other 
words, our effort was to move “methodological” conversation in anthropology 
beyond the discussion of ethnography.  
 
Over the following years, we undertook, both among ourselves and with others, 
a number of efforts to initiate discussions about concepts that might link 
apparently diverse anthropological projects through common problems. Collier 
and Lakoff organized two AAA sessions related to problems of method and 
concept-formation.3 Collier, with Aihwa Ong, put together an SSRC-funded 
workshop and co-edited a volume, Global Assemblages, to which both Lakoff 
and Rabinow contributed. The volume brought together scholars in 
anthropology, geography and sociology who shared an interest in concrete 
practices at the intersection of technology, politics and ethics. The hope was to 
generate a more sustained conversation about comparable findings and shared 
concepts, and to create a context in which a more substantive conversation 
might develop among scholars with knowledge about related issues.  
 
Based on some of the contributions to this volume, Collier and Lakoff wrote an 
article, “Ethics and the Anthropology of Modern Reason,” whose goal was to 
develop a concept that could both link together diverse individual research 
projects and generate novel insights through the comparison of cases.4 
 
All of these prior efforts were rewarding at a number of levels. But from the 
perspective of developing new modes of collaborative and collective work, they 
were frustrating. Rabinow, for his part, found that the response to his books on 
method was limited, and that the institutional conditions for collective work in 
anthropology were disappointing. Meanwhile, Global Assemblages stemmed 
from a rewarding and productive event – a conference in Prague in 2002. But 
ultimately the project served the function that most collective publications in 
anthropology served – to offer a vehicle for roughly likeminded scholars to 
publish an article on whatever it was they were already doing. In this sense, as 
an effort at tightening a community around a clearer sense of common 
problems or debates, its success seems to have been limited. This was 
perhaps due to the pressures of individual production, and the difficulty of 
getting a sustained conversation going among far-flung people.  
                                                
3 These included a panel on “Object and Method in Contemporary Anthropology” in 2000 and on 
“Technologies of the Human” in 2001. 
4 Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier, “Ethics and the Anthropology of Modern Reason.” 
Anthropological Theory; Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, eds. Global Assemblages: Technology, 
Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems. 
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These long-standing interests in collaborative work and inquiry were renewed 
by a series of challenges. A German graduate student at Berkeley, Tobias Rees, 
who had worked with Rabinow on Anthropos Today, proposed a doubtless 
naïve but nonetheless inspiring vision of a community along the lines of a group 
Hans Blumenberg was involved with in Germany. This group would meet 
periodically to pursue a kind of “philosophical symposium” where thinkers 
engaged in open and convivial exchange. It was unclear what exactly such a 
community would look like for anthropologists given the structure of the U.S. 
academy in the early 21st century, but it would clearly involve reflection on the 
generation of shared topics of inquiry and on the conditions under which 
collaboration could take place. 
 
Meanwhile, Roger Brent, a molecular biologist and head of the Molecular 
Sciences Institute, approached Rabinow with a series of challenges: what did 
the human sciences have to say about biosecurity and biodefense? And what 
contributions had anthropology made to the broader, non-academic world 
since the days of Ruth Benedict? Rabinow took this challenge as an 
opportunity to invite Collier and Lakoff – located, respectively, in New York and 
San Diego – to reflect on what kind of collaboration might be possible.  
 
This topic – biosecurity, and, more generally, new problematizations of security 
– was complex and heterogeneous. We all had areas of expertise that were 
orthogonal to but not directly about the topic. What is more, there did not seem 
to be compelling work either in anthropology or, more broadly, the areas of 
critical social theory upon which anthropologists customarily draw, that could 
orient us conceptually to contemporary security questions. Finally, this was a 
complex field that was developing simultaneously in many places. Leading labs 
in the molecular sciences were clearly one place to look. But biosecurity clearly 
would have to be traced through a number of other domains and sites in which 
simultaneous developments were taking place: public health organizations, 
security think tanks, the U.S. military, international organizations, and so on. 
Consequently, the issue was not only that the topic of security provided an 
excuse for doing something that we already wanted to do – i.e. work together. 
Moreover, this was a topic that seemed to demand collaboration, active work 
on concept formation, multiple soundings in diverse sites, and a research 
infrastructure that would allow an approach that was quite different from the 
individual project model. 
 
 
Why Laboratory? 
 
Initially, calling this kind of collaboration a “laboratory” may seem surprising, 
since on many important points any endeavor in the interpretive human 
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sciences has norms, practices, and goals that are very different from those of a 
laboratory in the natural sciences (see table 1). Thus, the term “laboratory” 
does not reflect any aspiration to move anthropology to the stage of a mature 
discipline that would finally achieve a positivistic scientific rigor (presumably like 
economics). We are not suggesting that anthropology can or ought to be a 
natural science. Nor do we propose a return to the days of the Human 
Relations Area Files and similar efforts, which sought to generate universal 
claims about the human condition by sending individual field workers off to 
multiple sites and then gathering together the resulting data under the rubric of 
a general theory of social development. 
 
What is more, there are many ways in which the practical organization of our 
collaboration differs from a laboratory in the natural sciences. It is not confined 
to a single site but is, rather, multi-sited. Initially, as noted above, Berkeley and 
New York are the major centers of activities in our lab, although it may grow to 
incorporate other sites. Our project does not involve the kind of division of labor 
or hierarchy found in a scientific lab. We do have an established hierarchy when 
it comes to dealing with administrative questions. But in matters of substance, 
we have none of the scientific lab’s sense that the intellectual direction is set by 
a “head” of the lab. Rather, research is tied together through a looser structure 
ofshared interests that are mutually inflected through discussion and concept 
development. 
 
That said, we have found the model of a laboratory helpful in thinking about our 
goals for this project, and for the kinds of questions we want to raise. We are 
very much intrigued by the idea of greater rigor and seriousness in subjecting 
our claims to tests of adequacy through experiment. But it is intriguing and 
challenging to ponder whether they could rest, as in a lab, on collective 
agreement and impersonal norms. At the same time, thinking about our 
collective endeavor as a laboratory has provoked reflection on the forms of 
interpersonal interaction and the infrastructures appropriate to – and necessary 
for – such an endeavor. Here work from the social studies of science has 
provided some useful insights. This work has shifted understandings of how 
scientific knowledge is generated from concerns with theories of scientific 
method to an emphasis on concept development, material practices of 
experiment, and informal norms that make possible trust and credibility. Both in 
the natural sciences and in our vision of a laboratory in the human sciences the 
context of a laboratory is critical to successful experimentation: informal norms, 
interpersonal relationships, material infrastructures, etc., are all crucial to how 
concepts, experimental objects can be stabilized, criticized, and worked on in 
the process of scientific inquiry.5  
                                                
5 See Karin Knorr-Cetina, 1992 "The Couch, the Cathedral and the Lab: On the Relationship between 
Experiment and Laboratory Science", in A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
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Table 1 
A Natural Science Laboratory versus a Laboratory in the Human Sciences 
 
 
 
Natural Science Laboratory 
Laboratory in the Interpretive 
Human Sciences 
Goals 
Generate and stabilize novel 
objects of knowledge and 
intervention 
 
Develop knowledge or technical 
capacities that can be 
reproduced beyond the space of 
the laboratory 
Develop concepts that make it 
possible to identify significant 
phenomena 
 
Reframe problems; diagnose 
stakes in problematic situations 
 
Focus on specificity, making 
contingency of things visible 
Material-institutional 
form 
 
Physically bounded; dependent 
on experimental devices; funding 
is critical 
 
Authoritative role of Lab Director 
in determining research priorities 
 
Physically dispersed; virtual 
infrastructure; loose and flexible 
interrelations between projects 
 
Seniority guides key 
organizational decisions but not 
directions of research or validity 
of claims 
Everyday practices 
 
Many people working in different 
roles on given experiment 
 
Lab meetings to coordinate 
activities, develop focused lines 
of investigation 
Development and refinement of 
concepts; proliferation of sites 
 
Independent research, 
comparison of findings 
Authorship and 
originality 
Contribution to “discoveries” 
credited through journal 
authorship 
 
Erasure of personality of 
individual researcher in collective 
practices of normal science 
Creation of knowledge remains 
author-centered 
 
Explicit reflection, Negotiation 
around various forms of 
authorship 
Relationship to broader 
field 
 
Competition/ collaboration with 
other laboratories pursuing similar 
lines of investigation 
 
Loose ties to other human 
science investigators 
Relationship of 
investigator to objects 
of investigation 
 
 
Transformation, objectification 
 
Adjacency, which may include 
transformation, objectification 
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The rubric of the laboratory has also forced us to think actively about the nature 
of collaborative work, originality, and authorship, and about the relationship of 
collective tasks such as concept building to what seem to be individual tasks, 
such as ethnographic fieldwork or focused historical research. Our object of 
inquiry is too extensive and heterogeneous to be successfully approached 
according to the traditional model of the single ethnographer in a field. Thus 
there are things we can achieve in a joint project that could not be done 
individually. In turn, our sense is that the collaboration and argument enriches 
and improves the individual work we are doing. Moreover, the collaboration has 
provided an opportunity to try out new ways of generating knowledge in the 
human sciences.  
  
At the same time, the collective project demanded reflection – on authorship for 
example: we needed new ways of thinking about how knowledge is generated 
and how credit is given. Here it is useful to contrast the laboratory model with 
the individual project model.  
 
 
The Individual Project Model versus the LAC 
 
In developing our thinking about the laboratory model, it has been useful to 
distinguish it from the individual project model, mentioned above (see table 2). 
Obviously such a distinction always has the risk of caricature. In developing it, 
we do not mean to attribute any particular position to specific authors or 
groups of authors, but rather to propose some generative contrasts that, we 
hope, can serve to promote more explicit reflection on matters of collaboration 
and the norms of knowledge production in our field. 
 
(1) Infrastructure and Institutional Organization 
 
Work according to the individual project model is done, for the most part, by 
scholars who hold professorships in universities, and they derive financial and 
institutional support from universities. The major infrastructures for 
communicating work among scholars are conferences, journals, and academic 
presses, along with personal communications among loose networks of like-
minded thinkers. On the one hand, the individual project model is not interested 
in explicit reflection on collective norms, since the focus is on individual 
production. On the other hand, collective decisions at the level of the institution 
(eg. hiring or tenure) must be made. This means that tacit norms guide 
institutional decision. The laboratory also depends on the university, at least in 
the sense that most participants (whether graduate students or faculty) are 
dependent on financial support from the university. But its structure is adjacent 
to a university. It is also adjacent to the institutions of professional association 
conferences, journals, and academic presses. Members of the laboratory – 
either individually or collectively – engage in these institutions. But the  
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Table 2: The Individual Project Model versus the LAC 
 
 
 
Individual Project Model 
Laboratory for the Anthropology of the 
Contemporary (LAC) 
Infrastructure 
and Institutional 
Organization 
 
 
• Academic department in 
university. 
 
• Conferences, journals, 
academic presses. 
 
• Networks, loose affiliations, 
based on mentor relations, 
shared topic areas. 
 
• Concern about the legitimacy 
of hierarchies; role of hierarchy 
is hard to understand. 
 
• Dependent on university but 
organizationally adjacent. 
 
• Virtual infrastructure linking a finite 
number of sites; meetings of principles; 
intensive work on discussion papers. 
 
• Ongoing relationships: role of 
intellectual trust (based on sense of 
shared concepts, problems); but also 
changing nexus of informal contact and 
collaborative work. 
 
• Explicit and openly discussed lines of 
authority for organizational decision-
making clearly separated from authority 
in making knowledge claims. 
Authorship and 
Originality 
• Sui generis intellectual 
production; connections among 
authors mostly through shared 
invocation of “theory.” 
 
• “Branding” of original 
concepts by individual authors. 
 
• Collected work (in volumes, 
based on conferences, 
workshops). 
• Recognition of diffuse character of 
authorship; individual authorship as a 
“problem” requiring negotiation, 
deliberation. 
 
• Emphasis on the development of 
shared concepts through a collective 
process. 
 
• Collective work – intense discussion, 
argument in production of texts. 
Experimentation 
and Validity 
 
 
• Experimentation with form in 
writing, styles of fieldwork. 
 
• Avant-garde effort to 
challenge/break away from 
existing norms. 
 
• Crisis in thinking about what 
constitutes a valid claim. 
 
• Authority connected to 
individualistic elements of 
fieldwork process and writing: 
“thick” description; virtuosic 
interpretation and writing. 
• Experimentation as a way to put 
concepts to the test, established agreed 
upon demonstrations of adequacy. 
 
• “Secessionist” effort to conserve what 
remains contemporary in existing norms 
and to adapt them or innovate in new 
contexts in relation to new problems. 
 
• Search for impersonal methodological 
norms: Are concepts adequate for 
clarifying significant problems? Are 
concepts diacritical, i.e., do they make 
the distinctions that matter? 
 
• Recognition of legitimate authority 
based on knowledge rather than status. 
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laboratory is based on other infrastructures – virtual infrastructures are 
particularly important – and other kinds of interpersonal relationships, which 
have to be explicitly worked on and cultivated. Finally, the laboratory has 
explicit lines of authority, particularly in matters that are purely administrative. 
But it is the aspiration of the laboratory to separate these formal hierarchies 
from authority in making knowledge claims.  
 
(2) Authorship and Originality 
 
The individual project model is based on what we think is a myth of sui generis 
intellectual production. In anthropology, this tends to mean that the force of 
creative energy  is assumed to arise from a unique encounter with the field, 
and from the interpretive and authorial virtuosity of an individual. “Thick 
description” and “brilliance” are the marks of good work. Prominence is gained 
through “branding,” by which individual scholars are associated with specific 
concepts that they have invented. The product of such work may be collected 
in volumes that serve the purpose, largely, of assembling what authors are 
already doing under a single cover. But collected volumes are rarely more than 
the sum of their parts, and they rarely reflect a collective process of 
conceptualization and thought. 
 
The aspiration of the laboratory, by contrast, is to more fully recognize the 
diffuse character of authorship, as it is formed through conversations, borrowed 
concepts, and exposure to the work of scholars working on related topics. In 
this sense, in the laboratory setting authorship is a “problem” to the extent that 
assigning individual authorship is always problematic. As a consequence, the 
norms of credit and of authorial claims are made an explicit object of reflection 
and discussion. Finally, a laboratory creates collective rather than collected 
work. That is, it seeks to create work that is truly shaped by the collective 
context in which it is generated. 
 
(3) Experimentation and Validity 
 
One important norm of work in the individual project model is “innovation,” not 
only in the adequate description of phenomena but in the form of writing and in 
theory. In this sense, it seems to follow many aspects of the model of the 
artistic avant-garde. It seeks to challenge or break away from existing norms. 
And the act of innovation, as in the artistic avant-garde, is very much focused 
on the individual creative experience. The validity of such innovation, therefore, 
is profoundly personal. It seems, however, that this avant-gardist model has 
not, in the interpretive human sciences, led to a satisfactory model for thinking 
about what counts as good work, or about what counts as an authoritative 
claim.  
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In a laboratory, by contrast, “experiment” does not refer to textual experiment. 
Rather, it refers to “controlled experimentation” that might lead to critical 
rectification of concepts and claims. In the course of experimentation concepts 
are put at risk through their use and interaction with cases – either they work or 
not. Here some insights about how experimental systems work in the natural 
sciences may prove fruitful. These systems are material and discursive 
arrangements for generating new things; they involve developing and sustaining 
a set of shared objects.6 This vision of experimentation and validity the 
validation of knowledge-claims seeks to be depersonalizing rather than 
emphasizing the virtues and talents of an individual author. 
 
 
An Experimental System 
 
How, then, does the laboratory function in practice? We are engaged in several 
different kinds of work, including: regular meetings among the principals to 
hash out ideas, which have led to several jointly authored papers; targeted 
collaborations on specific projects with other members of the laboratory – for 
example, Collier’s work with Lyle Fearnley on syndromic surveillance; field 
experiments, in which two or three members of the lab interview a security 
expert together; and an experiment in teaching a graduate seminar with a 
laboratory approach, now being undertaken by Rabinow.  
 
A critical part of the laboratory’s projects is to develop or hone conceptual tools 
and put them in motion – in writings, presentations, and conversations. We 
have been working on several different types of such tools. Some concern our 
relation to our field of inquiry – examples are “second-order observation,” 
“adjacency” and “technical criticism.” Other concepts seek to describe the 
types of objects we are interested in, such as “apparatus,” or “normative 
rationality.” Finally, there are conceptual tools for analyzing the 
problematization of security. Here we have been developing the concepts of 
“preparedness” and “vital systems security.”  
 
Collier and Lakoff constructed these latter concepts in relation to their own 
empirical soundings, such as historical research on civil defense and 
emergency management, as well as close work with colleagues in the 
laboratory. For example, Lyle Fearnley’s research into syndromic surveillance 
helped them to elaborate a key distinction between insurance and 
preparedness as forms of rationality. Similarly, Dale Rose’s work on the 
smallpox vaccination program helped them to see how elements of public 
health apparatuses may be retooled, through a rationale of preparedness, into 
aspects of vital systems security.  
                                                
6 Hans-Jorg Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things. Synthesizing Proteins !in the Test 
Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997. 
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Thus we are honing concepts as tools that can function in an experimental 
system; and trying to establish standards amongst ourselves. What seems 
unclear at the moment, and what we are exploring, is how far these 
experimental systems can be extended, and what kinds of collectivities they 
might include.  
